Monroeova doktrína

Tento ang­lický text před­sta­vuje tran­skripci zahra­ničně poli­tické dok­tríny, kte­rou ve svém posel­ství Kon­gresu 2. pro­since 1823 vyhlá­sil pre­zi­dent Spo­je­ných států ame­ric­kých James Monroe. Podle této Monro­eově dok­tríny evrop­ské moc­nosti nemají právo zasa­ho­vat do zále­ži­tostí nezá­vis­lých států na území ame­ric­kého kon­ti­nentu – Spo­jené státy ame­rické budou totiž jejich pří­padné vojen­ské akce na území ame­ric­kého kon­ti­nentu pova­žo­vat za „ohro­žení svého míru a bez­peč­nosti“ a „mani­festaci nepřá­tel­ského postoje vůči USA“.

At the pro­po­sal of the Rus­sian Impe­rial Gover­n­ment, made through the minis­ter of the Empe­ror resi­ding here, a full power and instructi­ons have been transmit­ted to the minis­ter of the Uni­ted Sta­tes at St. Peter­sburg to arrange by ami­ca­ble nego­ti­ation the respective rights and inte­rests of the two nati­ons on the northwest coast of this con­ti­nent. A simi­lar pro­po­sal has been made by His Impe­rial Majesty to the Gover­n­ment of Great Bri­tain, which has likewise been acce­ded to. The Gover­n­ment of the Uni­ted Sta­tes has been desi­rous by this fri­en­dly pro­ce­e­ding of mani­fes­ting the great value which they have inva­ri­a­bly atta­ched to the fri­end­ship of the Empe­ror and their soli­ci­tude to cul­ti­vate the best under­stan­ding with his Gover­n­ment. In the dis­cus­si­ons to which this inte­rest has given rise and in the arran­ge­ments by which they may ter­mi­nate the occasion has been jud­ged pro­per for asser­ting, as a prin­ci­ple in which the rights and inte­rests of the Uni­ted Sta­tes are invol­ved, that the Ame­ri­can con­ti­nents, by the free and inde­pen­dent con­di­tion which they have assu­med and main­tain, are hen­ce­forth not to be con­si­de­red as sub­jects for future colo­ni­zation by any Euro­pean powers…

It was sta­ted at the com­men­ce­ment of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Por­tu­gal to improve the con­di­tion of the peo­ple of those coun­tries, and that it appea­red to be con­duc­ted with extra­or­di­nary mode­ration. It need scar­cely be remar­ked that the results have been so far very dif­fe­rent from what was then anti­ci­pa­ted. Of events in that quar­ter of the globe, with which we have so much inter­course and from which we derive our ori­gin, we have always been anxi­ous and inte­res­ted specta­tors. The citi­zens of the Uni­ted Sta­tes che­rish sen­ti­ments the most fri­en­dly in favor of the liberty and hap­pi­ness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlan­tic. In the wars of the Euro­pean powers in mat­ters rela­ting to them­sel­ves we have never taken any part, nor does it com­port with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are inva­ded or seri­ously mena­ced that we resent inju­ries or make pre­pa­ration for our defense. With the move­ments in this hemisphere we are of neces­sity more imme­di­a­tely con­nec­ted, and by causes which must be obvi­ous to all enli­gh­te­ned and impar­tial obser­vers. The poli­ti­cal sys­tem of the allied powers is essen­ti­ally dif­fe­rent in this respect from that of Ame­rica. This dif­fe­rence pro­ce­eds from that which exists in their respective Gover­n­ments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achie­ved by the loss of so much blood and tre­a­sure, and matu­red by the wisdom of their most enli­gh­te­ned citi­zens, and under which we have enjoyed unexam­pled feli­city, this whole nation is devo­ted. We owe it, the­re­fore, to can­dor and to the ami­ca­ble relati­ons exis­ting between the Uni­ted Sta­tes and those powers to dec­lare that we should con­si­der any attempt on their part to extend their sys­tem to any por­tion of this hemisphere as dan­ge­rous to our peace and safety. With the exis­ting colo­nies or depen­den­cies of any Euro­pean power we have not inter­fe­red and shall not inter­fere. But with the Gover­n­ments who have dec­la­red their inde­pen­dence and main­tain it, and whose inde­pen­dence we have, on great con­si­de­ration and on just prin­ci­ples, acknowled­ged, we could not view any inter­po­si­tion for the pur­pose of oppres­sing them, or con­t­rol­ling in any other man­ner their destiny, by any Euro­pean power in any other light than as the mani­festation of an unf­ri­en­dly dis­po­si­tion toward the Uni­ted Sta­tes. In the war between those new Gover­n­ments and Spain we dec­la­red our neutra­lity at the time of their reco­gni­tion, and to this we have adhe­red, and shall con­ti­nue to adhere, pro­vi­ded no change shall occur which, in the jud­ge­ment of the com­pe­tent autho­ri­ties of this Gover­n­ment, shall make a corre­spon­ding change on the part of the Uni­ted Sta­tes indispensa­ble to their security.

The late events in Spain and Por­tu­gal shew that Europe is still unsett­led. Of this impor­tant fact no stron­ger proof can be addu­ced than that the allied powers should have thou­ght it pro­per, on any prin­ci­ple satis­fac­tory to them­sel­ves, to have inter­po­sed by force in the inter­nal con­cerns of Spain. To what extent such inter­po­si­tion may be carried, on the same prin­ci­ple, is a ques­tion in which all inde­pen­dent powers whose gover­n­ments dif­fer from the­irs are inte­res­ted, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the Uni­ted Sta­tes. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was ado­p­ted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agi­ta­ted that quar­ter of the globe, neverthe­less rema­ins the same, which is, not to inter­fere in the inter­nal con­cerns of any of its powers; to con­si­der the gover­n­ment de facto as the legi­ti­mate gover­n­ment for us; to cul­ti­vate fri­en­dly relati­ons with it, and to pre­serve those relati­ons by a frank, firm, and manly policy, mee­ting in all instan­ces the just claims of every power, sub­mit­ting to inju­ries from none. But in regard to those con­ti­nents cir­cum­stan­ces are emi­nently and con­spicu­ously different.

It is impossi­ble that the allied powers should extend their poli­ti­cal sys­tem to any por­tion of either con­ti­nent without endan­ge­ring our peace and hap­pi­ness; nor can any­one believe that our sou­thern bre­thren, if left to them­sel­ves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossi­ble, the­re­fore, that we should behold such inter­po­si­tion in any form with indi­f­fe­rence. If we look to the com­pa­ra­tive stren­gth and resour­ces of Spain and those new Gover­n­ments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvi­ous that she can never sub­due them. It is still the true policy of the Uni­ted Sta­tes to leave the par­ties to them­sel­ves, in hope that other powers will pur­sue the same course…